Page 41 - History 2020

Butterfield’s book in effect demolished the Whig Interpretation. The idea that history
should be studied for its own sake and on its own terms has become a consensus in
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the history profession. The events of the later 20 century reinforced this; the ending
of the British Empire and our decline as a world power undermined British
exceptionalism because it fed on success. Describing and explaining Britain’s decline
requires a very different type of history.

When we look at the events of 1832, we find support for Butterfield’s critique;

Antonia Fraser quotes Maitland’s aphorism. She stresses the drama, the fears, the
narrow victories and defeats, the sheer complexity of events and the uncertainty of
their outcome. The Whig Interpretation saw the story of the Reform Act as part of a
simple struggle between democracy-loving people and reactionary aristocrats. Yet
none were more aristocratic than the Whigs who drove the Reform Act, not to
achieve, but to avert, democracy; one of Grey’s big worries was that “Creation” might
undermine the aristocracy. “Finality Jack” says it all.

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It’s a similar story when we look at future 19 Reform Acts. Take the 1867 Reform
Act. Following big public demonstrations, the Liberal government (as the Whigs had
become) introduced a bill to extend the vote to upper working class voters. This was
helped by external factors; the death of Liberal leader Lord Palmerston, a stern
enemy of reform; and Lincoln’s victory in the American Civil War which showed that
democracy could prevail. But the Liberal ministry fell, and the incoming Tories, Lord
Derby and Benjamin Disraeli, decided to “dish the Whigs” by introducing their own,

more radical, bill. The Tories had long been out of office, and Disraeli hoped the
Tories would be rewarded by grateful voters (they weren’t). The Act gave votes to
male householders in the boroughs (i.e. urban areas). About a million adult males
could vote before; the Act doubled this. But the Tories added bizarre “fancy
franchise”, giving additional votes to graduates, professionals and those with over
£50 in savings, as a way of mitigating the democratic effects.

Thus, the 1867 Reform Act was passed not to fulfill our democratic destiny or on a
wave of democratic enthusiasm, but as a cynical and opportunistic Tory stunt, a ploy
to gain party advantage.

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The reality was that as the 19 century wore on, parliamentary reform lost its central
place on the wider reform agenda. The tactic of establishment reformers like Sir
Robert Peel – take the public’s minds off further reform of the voting system by
reforming everything else – seems to have worked. In the debates over the 1832

Reform Bill Peel had hinted at this strategy. He opposed extending the vote because